The grace of being wrong: falsifiability and explanatory limits
Imagine a theory that predicts that generous people give because they are generous, and selfish people refuse because they are secretly generous in a defensive way. Every possible action confirms it. Such a theory may be vivid literature; it is a poor test of behaviour. An account gains intellectual risk when it says what would count against it.
Karl Popper made falsifiability central to his account of scientific testing, although the philosophy of science has since developed substantial criticisms of using any single criterion to settle what counts as science. The useful lesson for this museum is narrower: when an explanation survives every imaginable counterexample, ask what work it is really doing. A metaphor can suggest a hypothesis. It cannot serve as evidence that the hypothesis is true.
Still, not every worthwhile sentence is an empirical proposition. A poem can change how a city feels without predicting its traffic. A moral argument can identify a value conflict without claiming a laboratory effect. The error arrives when art's evocative license is quietly converted into research's authority.
Curator's test: Say what kind of claim you are making—empirical, interpretive, fictional or normative. Then ask what sort of objection would actually change it. If the answer is “none,” do not dress it in the uniform of a discovery.
Research context: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Karl Popper” ↗ (interpretive source, not an endorsement of this exhibition).